The Right to Reimbursement: Nevada Courts Should Follow the Trend and Forbid Insurers from Seeking Recoupment of Defense Costs by Matteoni, Kristen
273 
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DUTY TO DEFEND AND AN INSURER’S RIGHT TO
REIMBURSEMENT OF DEFENSE COSTS 
Over the last twenty years, a battle has emerged between insurers and poli-
cyholders concerning which party should bear the burden of defense costs. This 
issue, which has yet to be settled in many jurisdictions, focuses on whether 
commercial general liability (“CGL”) policies allow for insurers to be reim-
bursed for the costs of defending claims that are later found not to be covered 
under the insurance policy.1 Logically, insurance companies argue that because 
the claims were found not to be covered by the policy, they should not bear the 
costs of their defense. However, the arguments that policyholders make are 
equally logical. Policyholders argue that insurance companies have significant-
ly more bargaining power than policyholders and that principles of equity and 
fairness should prohibit insurers from determining at some later date that the 
policyholder should pay defense costs. In response to such claims, policyhold-
ers typically argue that insurers are attempting to add new terms to the insur-
ance contract and thus are seeking payment for benefits that were not bargained 
for or agreed to in the original policy. 
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Vegas. The author sends a special thank you to her parents, Paul and Jacqueline Matteoni,
for their unwavering support and guidance, and to Doris S. and Theodore B. Lee Professor of
Law, Jeffrey Stemple, for his leadership and direction. The author would also like to thank
her friends at Boyd for all the laughter and love that has made the last three years so memo-
rable.
1  Benjamin D. Morgan, Courts Are Now Rejecting Insurers’ Reimbursement for Defending 
Non-covered Claims, A.B.A. (Sept. 12, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litig 
ation/committees/insurance/articles/julyaug2012-courts-rejecting-reimbursement2.html 
[https://perma.cc/HP36-PDR3]. 
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Unlike personal liability insurance, CGL insurance is provided to protect 
companies and other business organizations.2 CGL insurance protects the assets 
of a company and typically covers “the cost of [the company’s] legal defense 
and any settlement or award should [the company] be successfully sued.”3 Ac-
cordingly, under a standard CGL policy, when the policyholder is sued, the 
claim or claims are covered by the insurance policy, and the insurer steps in 
and pays for both the defense costs and any settlement or awarded monies. 
However, at the beginning of litigation, it is often difficult to determine where 
each of the individual claims stand. This difficulty arises three different ways: 
(1) some claims appear covered while others do not; (2) no claims appear cov-
ered; or (3) in the majority of situations, it is unknown which, if any, claims are
covered. Therefore, while the issue of which party should bear the burden of
defense costs arises very early in litigation, the answer is often not determined
until the very end of litigation—placing both the policyholder and insurer in a
difficult position.
Policyholders and insurers are placed in a tenuous situation because the to-
tal expenditures spent on defending claims have become an increasingly large 
portion of the total costs of a lawsuit. Due to these ever-increasing defense 
costs, it is understandable that insurers are looking for ways to recoup some of 
those expenses. One such attempt at recoupment has been through claims to the 
right to reimbursement. 
It was not until the 1997 California Supreme Court Buss v. Superior Court 
decision that the insurer’s right to reimbursement was given any serious con-
sideration.4 The Buss decision, which remains the seminal case on this topic, is 
discussed at length below. In the aftermath of the ruling in Buss, it was inevita-
ble that other jurisdictions would soon have to decide whether to allow or for-
bid insurers from seeking reimbursement of defense costs. It should be noted 
that because each state maintains its own insurance laws, inconsistent rulings 
on the right to reimbursement have been handed down across the United States. 
A. An Overview of the Duty to Defend: The “Four Corners” Rule v. The
“Extrinsic Evidence” Rule
As a general rule, modern CGL insurance agreements contain two over-
arching promises to the insured: (1) the duty to defend, and (2) the duty to in-
demnify. The duty to defend is a promise by the insurer to defend the insured in 
2  Commercial General Liability (CGL) Policy, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., 
https://www.irmi.com/online/insurance-glossary/terms/c/commercial-general-liability-cgl- 
policy.aspx [https://perma.cc/L33Z-VDJ6] (last visited Sept. 1, 2016). 
3  Caron Beesley, General Business Liability Insurance—How It Works and What Coverage 
Is Right for You, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (Sep. 26, 2016), https://www.sba.gov/ 
blogs/general-business-liability-insurance-how-it-works-and-what-coverage-right-you [http 
s://perma.cc/A82R-679Z]. 
4  Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). 
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a legal action.5 The duty to indemnify is “the insurer’s agreement to pay for the 
insured’s legal liability up to the stated policy limits.”6 The duty to defend is 
broader than the duty to indemnify.7 Unlike the duty to indemnify, the duty to 
defend extends to frivolous, false, and even fraudulent claims.8 If an insurance 
policy contains an obligation to defend, the insurer is required to defend any 
claim that potentially falls within the scope of the insurance policy.9 Thus, to 
determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend, the court must first deter-
mine whether there is a single claim potentially covered under the policy.10 
The duty to defend seems absolute. However, courts differ on whether or 
not information outside the complaint can be considered when determining if 
an insurer’s duty to defend has been activated.11 Courts—that do not allow ex-
trinsic evidence to be considered when evaluating an insurer’s obligations—
abide by the “four corners” rule, indicating that these courts will only analyze 
what appears within the four corners of the document.12 “While many states 
adhere to the ‘four corners’ rule, about twice as many do not and have conclud-
ed that extrinsic evidence can be considered by a court in its duty to defend de-
termination.”13 This second approach is commonly known as the “extrinsic evi-
dence” rule.14 Under this rule, the information the court can draw from when 
making decisions is significantly greater, although the duty to defend still turns 
on whether there are any potentially covered claims.15  
An argument could be made that Nevada traditionally adopted the extrinsic 
evidence rule. The Nevada Supreme Court previously held that: 
[A]n insurer . . . bears a duty to defend its insured whenever it ascertains facts
which give rise to the potential of liability under the policy. Once the duty to de-
fend arises, this duty continues throughout the course of the litigation. If there is
any doubt about whether the duty to defend arises, this doubt must be resolved
in favor of the insured. The purpose behind construing the duty to defend so
broadly is to prevent an insurer from evading its obligation to provide a defense
for an insured without at least investigating the facts behind a complaint.16
5  Eliot M. Harris, The Duty to Defend: What Insurers, Insureds and Their Counsel Need to 
Know When Faced with a Liability Coverage Dispute, A.B.A., http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/duty.html 
[https://perma.cc/P4BD-RYAD] (last visited Aug. 27, 2016). 
6  Id. 
7  Id. 
8  RANDY J. MANILOFF & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE:
KEY ISSUES IN EVERY STATE 111 (3d ed. 2015). 
9  See id. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. at 111–12. 
12  Id. at 112. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 99 P.3d 1153, 1158 (Nev. 2004) (emphasis add-
ed) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
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 However, in 2014, the United States District Court for the District of Ne-
vada, looking to United National Insurance Co. v. Frontier Insurance Co. in its 
ruling, came to “[t]he logical conclusion [] that Nevada has adopted the four 
corners doctrine even though the Nevada Supreme Court has yet to explicitly 
state that.”17 By this implication, in Nevada, an insurer has a duty to defend the 
insured “whenever it ascertains facts which give rise to the potential of liability 
under the policy.”18 However, there is no duty to defend where claims are prov-
en to be outside the policy.19 The universal test for determining whether an in-
surer has a duty to defend rests solely on whether any claim alleged in the 
complaint is potentially covered under the insurance policy.20 
B. Situations in Which the Right to Reimbursement Arises: Uncertain and
“Mixed Action” Claims
Because an insurer has a duty to defend all potentially covered claims, the
right to reimbursement typically arises in two instances. The first is when cov-
erage is uncertain, meaning an insurer cannot determine at the early stages of 
litigation whether or not a claim is covered by the policy.21 The second is 
known as a “mixed action” suit.22 A mixed action claim contains two types of 
claims: some that are covered by the policy and others that are not.23 Mixed ac-
tion suits are commonly associated with right to reimbursement issues because 
insurers acknowledge that a duty to defend exists but reserve the right to seek 
payment for non-covered claims or settlements.24 
Accordingly, in mixed action cases where the duty to defend exists, an in-
surer is obligated to pay for the policyholders’ defense costs, subject to a reser-
vation of rights that may disclaim coverage at a later date.25 Assuming that it 
can be shown that defense costs were paid for non-covered claims, the issue 
arises as to whether the insurer can seek reimbursement from the policyholder 
17  Andrew v. Century Sur. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00978-APG-PAL, 2014 WL 1764740, at *5 (D. 
Nev. Apr. 29, 2014). 
18  United Nat’l Ins. Co., 99 P.3d at 1158. 
19  Id. 
20  James W. Carbin & Alissa M. Christie, An Insured’s Obligation to Reimburse Its Insurer 
for Costs Expended in the Defense of Non-Covered Claims, 16 MEALEY’S EMERGING INS.
DISPUTES, Nov. 3, 2011, at 24; see Erie Ins. Exch. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 533 A.2d 1363, 
1368 (Pa. 1987). 
21  Bob Allen et al., Reversing Course: Can an Insurer Seek Reimbursement from Its Policy-
holder for Amounts Related to Noncovered Claims?, in 2011 INSURANCE COVERAGE
LITIGATION COMMITTEE CLE SEMINAR, MARCH 3–5, 2011: INSURER REIMBURSEMENT FROM A
POLICYHOLDER 1 (2011), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/insurance/docs/ 
2011-cle-materials/11-ReimbursementPaymentClaims/11aReversingCourseCanInsurer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YEX8-JXNV]. 
22  Id. at 2. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
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for those defense costs.26 “In most jurisdictions an insurer must defend a mixed 
action in its entirety.”27 Under this rule, an insurer will often pay to defend non-
covered claims.28 It is from these situations that claims by insurers to the right 
to reimbursement emerged.  
On one side of the argument, insurers claim that allowing for reimburse-
ment “promotes early settlements and avoids a windfall to the insured in the 
form of indemnity for uncovered claims.”29 Insurers reason that forbidding re-
coupment of defense costs of non-covered claims would grant the insured a 
windfall benefit, which was neither stipulated to in the policy nor included in 
the premium.30 On the other side, policyholders argue that the right to reim-
bursement is not an express term of the policy and thus is not considered bind-
ing on the policyholder.31 Policyholders contend that allowing additional terms 
to be added to the policy agreement, which was originally drafted by the insur-
er, would provide the insurer with additional benefits that were not bargained 
for by the parties.32 
Courts across the country have reached different conclusions concerning 
whether insurers maintain a right to seek reimbursement for defense costs. Part 
II of this note analyzes the California Supreme Court’s ruling in Buss v. Supe-
rior Court and the shift in determining whether an insurer has the right to seek 
reimbursement if the right has been properly reserved. Part III of this note dis-
cusses the holding of two Texas Supreme Court rulings in Texas Association of 
Counties County Government Risk Management Pool v. Matagorda County and 
Excess Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc., 
as well as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in American & Foreign In-
surance Co. v. Jerry’s Sports Center, Inc. The latter two decisions from 2008 
and 2010, respectively, reject the Buss holding. Part IV of this note reviews the 
limited case law in Nevada and briefly analyzes the questions left unanswered 
by the existing cases. Part V creates a “what if” situation for Nevada and ana-
lyzes a best-case scenario moving forward.  
26  Id. 
27  Randall L. Smith & Fred A. Simpson, The Mixed Action Rule and Apportion-
ment/Allocation of Defense Costs and Indemnity Dollars, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 97, 100 
(2003). 
28  Allen et al., supra note 21, at 2. 
29  Id. 
30  Carbin & Christie, supra note 20, at 23–24. 
31  See Allen et al., supra note 21, at 3. 
32  Id. (“Policyholders have also argued that the potential for insurance coverage drives up 
the settlement value of a case, which should not be borne by the policyholder if there is no 
coverage.”). 
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II. ALLOWING INSURERS THE RIGHT TO SEEK REIMBURSEMENT FOR NON-
COVERED CLAIMS: A STUDY OF BUSS V. SUPERIOR COURT 
Imagine a lawsuit that alleges twenty-seven separate causes of action. Of 
those twenty-seven causes of action, only a single claim is potentially covered 
under the policyholder’s insurance agreement.33 However, because one of the 
claims is potentially covered, the insurer agrees to defend the entire suit but 
conditions the defense on a reservation of rights.34 Ultimately, the parties 
agreed to the terms, and the insurer undertook the defense costs of the policy-
holder.35 Such was the situation that led to the seminal case of Buss v. Superior 
Court in 1997. In Buss, the ultimate settlement was for a total of $8.5 million, 
and defense counsel was paid out just over $1 million.36 Of the incurred costs, 
an expert for Transamerica, the insurer, determined that approximately 
$21,720.00 to $55,767.50 was related to defending the sole claim that was po-
tentially covered by the insurance policy.37 
Transamerica later refused to contribute to the $8.5 million settlement, and 
therefore, Buss, the policyholder, sued Transamerica.38 Buss claimed that 
Transamerica breached its contract by denying that it had a duty to defend the 
suit in its entirety and to contribute to the settlement.39 The California Supreme 
Court first expressed that the duty to defend is absolute and that the insurer 
cannot seek a recoupment for claims that are potentially covered because those 
costs were bargained for and premiums were paid for this obligation.40 Despite 
this reasoning, the Buss court went on to rule that CGL insurers (like 
Transamerica) have a right to reimbursement of defense costs for claims not 
potentially covered under the insurance policy.41 
The court reasoned that the insurer had not bargained for these costs nor 
had it been paid premiums for the costs, and, therefore, it had a right to seek 
reimbursement for defense costs.42 In a footnote, the Buss court further rea-
soned that the right of reimbursement need not be an express term of the policy 
but rather is implied-in-law.43 However, in mixed action suits, the court stated 
that an insurer seeking reimbursement has the burden of proving, by a prepon-
33  Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766, 770 (Cal. 1997). 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. at 771. 
40  Id. at 774–75. 
41  Id. at 776. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. at 776 n.13. 
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derance of the evidence, which claims are not potentially covered and thus 
which costs can be allotted to the non-covered claims.44  
A. Reaffirming the Buss Decision: Other Cases That Permit Insurers to Seek
Recoupment of Defense Costs for Uncovered Claims
The California Supreme Court has affirmed the Buss holding on multiple
occasions. For example, in Blue Ridge Insurance Co. v. Jacobsen, despite an 
insured’s adamant refusal to accept the insurer’s right to reimbursement at the 
time of the settlement, the court applied the Buss rationale in favor of the insur-
er seeking recoupment for the settlement costs.45 Similarly, in United National 
Insurance Co. v. SST Fitness Corp., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that a newly formed implied-in-fact contract established the insurer’s right to 
reimbursement.46 In SST Fitness, the court reasoned that because the insurer 
undertook the defense only on the express and specific condition of a reserva-
tion of rights, an implied-in-fact contract was created upon the policyholder’s 
acceptance of the defense.47 Additionally, in Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. MV 
Transportation, the Supreme Court of California held that the right to reim-
bursement applied to all non-covered claims and not merely those within the 
context of mixed action suits.48 
The rationales from Buss, Blue Ridge, SST Fitness, and MV Transportation 
were melded in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii deci-
sion, Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Sullivan Properties, Inc.49 In Sullivan, the 
court first determined that the right to seek reimbursement was implied within 
the terms of the insurance policy.50 While the court relied heavily on contract 
principles, it went further by stating that the reservation of rights letters that ex-
plicitly reserved the right to seek reimbursement (despite the fact that they were 
never accepted by the policyholder) created a new contract.51 The court also re-
lied heavily on equity principles and claims that public policy strongly favored 
the insurer’s right to reimbursement.52 
44  Id. at 778. An analysis of the burden of proof in right to reimbursement matters is outside 
the scope of this article. 
45  See Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jacobsen, 22 P.3d 313, 231 (Cal. 2001). 
46  See United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. SST Fitness Corp., 309 F.3d 914, 921 (6th Cir. 2002). 
47  See id. 
48  See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. MV Transp., 115 P.3d 460, 471 (Cal. 2005). 
49  Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Sullivan Props. Inc., No. 04-00550-HG-BMK, 2007 WL 2247795, 
at *5–6 (D. Haw. Aug. 2, 2007). 
50  Id. at *3. 
51  See id. 
52  Id. at *19–20. 
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B. The Rationale Behind Why Courts Have Allowed Insurers to Seek
Recoupment of Defense Costs for Uncovered Claims
Following the decision in Buss and the related cases, insurers across the
country began reserving the right to seek reimbursement for defense costs. For 
a brief period, it appeared that Buss would carry the day and that all jurisdic-
tions would adopt the Buss reasoning. The courts that have followed the Buss 
line of reasoning typically based such holdings on principles of equity, con-
tract, or both.53 Of the courts that rely on equity principles, the concepts of un-
just enrichment and restitution are most often cited. As such, some courts rea-
son that allowing policyholders to experience a windfall benefit by having the 
insurer pay for defense costs of non-covered claims would violate basic under-
standing of fairness.54 
There are many courts that rely on contract principles such as quasi-
contract or implied-in-fact contract to uphold the right of reimbursement. So 
long as an insurer properly reserves the right to seek reimbursement and a poli-
cyholder accepted payment of defense costs without protest, a handful of courts 
have allowed insurers the right to seek reimbursement.55 The courts that have 
allowed the right to reimbursement have rationalized that a reservation of rights 
letter establishes an offer to form a new contract.56 This new contract is deter-
mined to be binding upon the acceptance of the defense by policyholder.57 
However, as discussed in Part III, this line of thinking is not absolute, and nu-
merous courts have rejected this reasoning. 
Generally, courts that allow insurers to seek the right to reimbursement 
maintain that insurers and policyholders are equals in terms of finances and 
bargaining power. Policyholders may: (1) decline the defense and seek recov-
ery under the insurance policy; (2) decline the defense and file a declaratory 
judgment action; or (3) accept the defense under a reservation of rights.58 Based 
on this rationale, the concept that public policy favors the insurer is stronger 
because the insurer’s expectations in relation to protection of the policyholder 
are placed on more level footing. 
53  Morgan, supra note 1. 
54  See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Grand Pointe, LLC, 501 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1169 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2007); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Compaq Comput. Corp., 377 F. Supp. 2d 
719, 723 (D. Minn. 2005), aff’d, 457 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2006); Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Jacob-
sen, 22 P.3d 313, 321 (Cal. 2001). 
55  See Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Shierk, 996 F. Supp. 836, 839 (S.D. Ill. 1998); 
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ribi Immunochem Research, Inc., 108 P.3d 469, 480 (Mont. 
2005). 
56  Morgan, supra note 1. 
57  See id. 
58  United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. SST Fitness Corp., 309 F.3d 914, 921 (6th Cir. 2002) (“When 
faced with a reservation of rights, the insured can choose to: 1) decline the offer, pay for the 
defense, and seek to recover on the policy; 2) decline the offer and file a declaratory judg-
ment action; or 3) accept the offer subject to the reservation of rights.”). 
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Although for a short time it appeared as if all courts would follow the Buss 
line of reasoning concerning the right to reimbursement of non-covered claims, 
such a majority opinion has dissipated over time. While rejection of the Buss 
viewpoint was previously seen as a minority position, it is now equal to or even 
surpasses the Buss viewpoint in many states. The next part demonstrates this 
shift away from Buss and the rationale behind it. 
III. A SHIFT IN THINKING: THE MOVEMENT AWAY FROM BUSS AND THE
RATIONALE BEHIND DENYING INSURERS THE RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT
Courts have rejected the Buss holding for a wide variety of reasons. Many 
courts find that the right to reimbursement is inconsistent with the duty to de-
fend while others note the imbalance of power between the insurer and the pol-
icyholder. Other courts maintain that the express terms of the contract prohibit 
the addition of new terms. Woven throughout each of these analyses floats the 
issue of reservation of rights letters. Overall, courts rejecting the idea that in-
surers may seek recoupment of defense costs hold that reservation of rights let-
ters fail to create express or implied contract terms. Thus, insurers are unable to 
enforce these new, unaccepted, and unbargained-for terms. In particular, Texas 
has delved into the scope of insurers’ rights to reimbursement concerning non-
covered claims.  
A. Texas’s Approach to Denying Insurers the Right to Reimbursement
In Texas Association of Counties County Government Risk Management
Pool v. Matagorda County, decided in 2000, the Texas Supreme Court held 
that a CGL insurer was not entitled to reimbursement from its policyholder for 
settlement costs paid by the insurer, despite a reservation of rights.59 In Mata-
gorda County, the plaintiffs were three prisoners who were assaulted by other 
inmates; they subsequently sued the inmates and the sheriff of the Matagorda 
County prison.60 The inmates and the sheriff demanded that Texas Association 
of Counties County Government Risk Management Pool (“TAC”) defend and 
indemnify them under the insurance policy maintained by the jail.61 Initially, 
TAC refused.62 However, TAC later agreed to undertake the defense costs, sub-
ject to a reservation of rights.63 TAC eventually settled the claim for $300,000 
and sought reimbursement.64 The Texas Supreme Court held that because there 
was no express agreement between the policyholder and TAC allowing for the 
59  Tex. Ass’n of Ctys. Cty. Gov’t Risk Mgmt. Pool v. Matagorda Cty., 52 S.W.3d 128, 136 
(Tex. 2000). 
60  Id. at 129. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. at 130. 
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insurer to seek recoupment, TAC was not entitled to reimbursement.65 The 
court further stated that unless the policy expressly provides that the insurer is 
entitled to reimbursement or that the policyholder clearly and unequivocally 
agrees to the terms, a reservation of rights letter is ineffective.66  
The Matagorda County court further suggested that TAC’s reservation of 
rights letter was an attempt to unilaterally amend the insurance contract and add 
additional rights, making the letter invalid.67 The court acknowledged that its 
decision to deny reimbursement could possibly place insurers in a difficult po-
sition.68 However, the court held that “insurers are better positioned to handle 
this risk, either by drafting policies to specifically provide for reimbursement or 
by accounting for the possibility that they may occasionally pay uncovered 
claims in their rate structure.”69 Additionally, in response to TAC’s argument 
that denying reimbursement allowed the insurer to be unjustly enriched, the 
court stated that clear and unequivocal consent to reimbursement is required, 
“[o]therwise, the [policyholder] is forced to choose between rejecting a settle-
ment within policy limits or accepting a possible financial obligation to pay an 
amount that may be beyond its means, at a time when the [policyholder] is 
most vulnerable.”70 
Eight years later, in Excess Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Frank’s Casing 
Crew & Rental Tools, Inc., Texas addressed and clarified the standard of “clear 
and unequivocal” agreement by the policyholder, as originally expressed in 
Matagorda County.71 The court again acknowledged the difficult position that 
insurers may sometimes face through the denial of the right to reimbursement 
but maintained that the insurer is “in the best position to assess the viability of 
its coverage dispute.”72 Frank’s Casing differed from Matagorda County in 
that the policyholder acknowledged from the outset that that settlement offer 
was reasonable and demanded that the insurer accept it.73  
The insurer in Frank’s Casing argued that an implied agreement to the 
right to reimbursement was created when the policyholder demanded that the 
insurer accept the settlement.74 The court upheld the Matagorda County reason-
ing and further held that because there was no clear and unequivocal consent 
between the parties, no implied-in-fact agreement had been reached.75 The 
court specifically stated: 
65  Id. at 136. 
66  Id. at 135–36. 
67  Id. at 131–32. 
68  Id. at 135. 
69  Id. at 136. 
70  Id. at 134–35. 
71  Excess Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 
42, 43 (Tex. 2008). 
72  Id. at 46 (quoting Tex. Ass’n of Ctys., 52 S.W.3d at 135). 
73  Id. at 43–44. 
74  Id. at 48. 
75  Id. at 48–49. 
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This is a far cry from impliedly consenting to reimbursement. . . . Given the par-
ties’ explicit efforts to preserve their positions, it makes no more sense to say 
that Frank’s Casing impliedly agreed to reimburse the carriers than it would to 
say that the carriers impliedly agreed to waive their coverage position.76 
The court similarly rejected the insurer’s right to reimbursement under eq-
uity and public policy principles, focusing instead on the forcing of an insured 
“to choose between rejecting a settlement within policy limits or accepting a 
possible financial obligation to pay an amount that may be beyond [the in-
sured’s] means.”77 
B. Pennsylvania’s Line of Attack Against Insurers Seeking the Right to
Reimbursement
In 2010, Pennsylvania similarly held that insurers lacked the right to seek
reimbursement of non-covered claims. In American & Foreign Insurance Co. 
v. Jerry’s Sport Center, Inc., the National Association of Colored People
(“NAACP”) sued a company selling firearms in an attempt to hold the firearms
industry liable for injuries, deaths, and damages for distributing firearms in a
negligent manner.78 The firearms vendor demanded that its insurer defend and
indemnify it as the policyholder under its CGL policy.79 The insurer undertook
representation under a full reservation of rights and sent the firearms vendor
multiple reservation of rights letters.80
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently held that reservation of 
rights letters could not be used to reserve a right that was not in the original 
CGL policy.81 The court stated that to allow such a reservation of rights would 
be “tantamount to allowing the insurer to extract a unilateral amendment to the 
insurance contract.”82 Moreover, the court emphasized that the Buss holding 
was inconsistent with Pennsylvania’s broad duty to defend because the right 
and duty to defend would become contingent upon the court’s determination 
that covered claims had been alleged.83 
Pennsylvania’s highest court also rejected the insurer’s equity arguments. 
The court reasoned that because the insurer has not only a duty to defend but 
also the right to defend, both the insurer and policyholder benefit.84 The policy-
holder is spared the costs of defense, but the insurer is able to control the de-
76  Id. at 48. 
77  Id. at 46 (quoting Tex. Ass’n of Ctys., 52 S.W.3d at 134); see Allen et al., supra note 21, at 
11. 
78  Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 529 (Pa. 2010). 
79  Id. 
80  Id. at 530. 
81  Id. at 544. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. at 536–39. 
84  Id. at 545. 
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fense and is able to protect itself from the risk of indemnity.85 Finally, the court 
expressed concerns that allowing insurers to seek reimbursement outside of the 
express CGL policy would place the policyholder at the mercy of the insurer.86 
“The court was concerned that allowing the insurer to ‘design’ its own right of 
reimbursement would open the door to unjustified maneuverings by insurance 
companies at their policyholders’ expense.”87 Accordingly, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that even when an insurer sends a reservation of rights let-
ter, the insurer cannot recoup defense costs from the policyholder absent a clear 
agreement.88 
C. New York’s Recent Decision Rejecting an Insurer’s Claims of
Reimbursement of Defense Costs
More recently, New York courts were faced with the same dilemma as that
of Texas and Pennsylvania: Would the state allow insurers to seek reimburse-
ment of non-covered claims and, if so, under what reasoning? While the issue 
has been largely ignored by many state courts, New York courts have ad-
dressed this issue on four occasions, generally appearing to favor the insurers 
and approve of the right to reimbursement.89 However, the most current and de-
tailed opinion, from the Eastern District of New York, follows the recent trend 
prohibiting insurers from seeking recoupment of defense costs.90 
In General Star Indemnity Co. v. Driven Sports, Inc., the insurer of Driven 
Sports, a manufacturer and seller of an energy supplement titled “Craze,” 
sought reimbursement for defense costs.91 The Court summarized the opinion 
as follows:  
In 2013, defendant was sued in three separate actions . . . alleging that Craze 
contains an illegal and potentially dangerous methamphetamine analog, and de-
fendant sought coverage under the Policy. Both parties have moved for sum-
mary judgment, asking the Court to declare the extent of plaintiff’s obligation to 
85  Id. 
86  Id. at 545–46. 
87  Morgan, supra note 1. 
88  Am. & Foreign Ins. Co., 2 A.3d at 546; see Morgan, supra note 1. 
89  See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Lacher & Lovell-Taylor, P.C., 975 
N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); Am. Family Home Ins. Co. v. Delia, No. 12-CV-5380-
ADS-WDW, 2013 WL 6061937, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2013); Max Specialty Ins. Co. v. 
WSG Inv., LLC, No. 09-CV-05237-CBA-JMA, 2012 WL 3150579, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 
20, 2012) (report and recommendation), adopted by 2012 WL 3150577 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 
2012); Gotham Ins. Co. v. GLNX, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 6415 (TPG), 1993 WL 312243, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1993). 
90  See Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Driven Sports, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 442, 445–46 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
91  Id. at 445; Randy J. Maniloff, New York Court Says N-O to Reimbursement of Defense 
Costs: Most Extensive N.Y. Case to Address the Issue, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM INS. L. 
(Mar. 5, 2015, 2:16 PM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/insurance/b/insurance 
law/archive/2015/03/05/new-york-court-says-n-o-to-reimbursement-of-defense-costs-most-
extensive-n-y-case-to-address-the-issue.aspx [https://perma.cc/8TAN-UQD8]. 
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defend the underlying lawsuits. The Court concludes that the underlying law-
suits are excluded from coverage by a [the Failure to Conform Exclusion] provi-
sion in the Policy.92 
Once it was determined that the claims were not covered by the insurance 
policy, the insurer sought reimbursement for defense costs of these uncovered 
claims.93 However, the court found that reimbursement would be inappropriate 
in this case.94 This was a somewhat surprising decision as four previous deci-
sions in New York had allowed for recoupment of defense costs.95 Nonetheless, 
the Driven Sports court determined that because the policyholder had “effec-
tively resisted the idea of recoupment from the very beginning by rejecting 
plaintiff’s offer of a separate recoupment agreement” that this case differed 
from precedent.96 
The New York court cited nearly every reason, as stated by every other 
court, as to why recoupment was inappropriate.97 The list included much of the 
reasoning discussed above—namely unjust enrichment, the broad duty to de-
fend, and principles of equity and fairness.98 Additionally, the Driven Sports 
court stated that failure to contract for the right to reimbursement from the out-
set is a fault that lies with the insurer.99 The court addressed implied-in-fact 
contracts and reservation of rights letters in one sentence by stating that the in-
surer “bears the risk of not providing for recoupment in the Policy itself, and 
[the insurer] is not saved by its later, unilateral reservation of rights.”100 
Finally, the New York court made a public policy argument, asserting that 
the rule currently encourages policyholders to seek out coverage.101 But, if in-
surers could later threaten to seek recoupment of defense costs, policyholders 
would lose substantial incentives to seeking CGL coverage and “would be 
faced with a ‘Hobson’s choice’ in any close case.”102 Put simply, policyholders 
with claims that may potentially be covered would be deterred from seeking 
coverage out of fear and unease that the defense costs would be unreasonably 
prohibitive, and the policyholder would be unable to repay them if the court 
92  Gen. Star Indem. Co., 80 F. Supp. 3d at 445. 
93  Id. at 445. 
94  Id. 
95  See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Lacher & Lovell-Taylor, P.C., 975 
N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013); Am. Family Home Ins. Co. v. Delia, No. 12-CV-5380-
ADS-WDW, 2013 WL 6061937, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2013); Max Specialty Ins. Co. v. 
WSG Inv., LLC, No. 09-CV-05237-CBA-JMA, 2012 WL 3150579, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 
20, 2012) (report and recommendation), adopted by 2012 WL 3150577 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 
2012); Gotham Ins. Co. v. GLNX, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 6415 (TPG), 1993 WL 312243, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1993). 
96  Gen. Star Indem. Co., 80 F. Supp. 3d at 460. 
97  See generally id. at 460–63. 
98  Id. at 460–63. 
99  Id. at 461. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. at 462. 
102  Id. 
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later ruled in favor of the insurer.103 By ruling against the right to reimburse-
ment and concisely combining the rationales of several courts throughout the 
United States, the New York court struck a blow for insurers. 
D. The Reasoning Behind the Decisions That Have Rejected the Right to
Reimbursement: Contract Principles, Imbalances of Power, the Duty to
Defend, and Equity and Fairness
While many jurisdictions have yet to address whether an insurer may seek
reimbursement for defense costs of non-covered claims, the courts that have 
elected to reject Buss maintain that such a reasoning is the more equitable ap-
proach. First, these jurisdictions point to general contract principles contained 
in the express language of the CGL policy. The terms of the contracts state that 
the insurer has a duty to defend the policyholder and has no authority to issue a 
unilateral modification of the contract.104 
Furthermore, the insurance company is the original drafter of the CGL 
policy.105 This severely weakens the insurer’s argument for why it should be 
allowed to create new contract terms to which the policyholder never agreed 
and often, expressly rejected. The insurer had the opportunity, at the time of 
drafting, to include language in the policy concerning the right to reimburse-
ment. However, if language that would provide for a right to reimbursement is 
absent from a CGL policy, then a unilateral imposition of such terms, at a later 
date, would unfairly burden the policyholder. “Moreover, by defending the in-
sured, the carrier also benefits its own self-interests by controlling the defense 
with the hope of avoiding or minimizing its indemnity obligation.”106 
Courts that have rejected the Buss line of reasoning also assert that a right 
to reimbursement is wholly inconsistent with the duty to defend.107 Any claim 
that is even potentially covered by the applicable insurance policy prompts the 
duty to defend.108 However, a court may determine at a later date that there are 
no covered claims, and thus, there is no duty to indemnify. Remembering that 
the duty to indemnify is narrower than the duty to defend, “[t]o allow the insur-
er to be reimbursed for defense costs would improperly place those two con-
tractual rights on the same level—yet, they have historically always been con-
103  Id. (“As it operates now, this rule incentivizes an insured to seek coverage, but if insurers 
can threaten the later collection of costs, an insured’s incentives would change drastically, 
and he would be faced with a ‘Hobson’s choice’ in any close case. In other words, an insured 
whose claim might be covered could be dissuaded from seeking coverage out of concern that 
the legal costs would be so prohibitive that the insured could never pay them if a court later 
disagreed.”) (emphasis in original). 
104  Morgan, supra note 1. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. 
107  See Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 543–44 (Pa. 2010). 
108  Harris, supra note 5. 
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sidered separate and apart.”109 Therefore, by rejecting the right to reimburse-
ment, the line that separates the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify is 
never blurred. 
Finally, the Buss court heavily relied on the concept of fairness, specifical-
ly lack of fairness to the insurer in paying defense costs for non-covered 
claims.110 However, the courts that have elected not to follow the Buss reason-
ing reiterate that the insurer is in a far superior position to know the nature and 
extent of claims that could potentially be covered.111 Moreover, insurers control 
the defense and are able to position themselves in a way so as to minimize the 
risk of indemnifications. Thus, if the courts were to allow insurers to unilateral-
ly amend CGL policies through reservation of rights letters, then the “unfair-
ness” would burden the policyholder in a significantly greater manner than the 
insurer. The insurer is in a better position to take such risks and therefore 
should be the party to carry that burden. 
Accordingly, the recent shift has been a departure from Buss and a move 
toward denying the right of reimbursement for defense costs. The express lan-
guage of a CGL policy, the broad duty to defend, and the increased burden that 
would be placed on the policyholder have provided the basis for rejecting in-
surers’ rights to reimbursement. For these reasons, many courts have rejected 
Buss and denied insurers the right to reimbursement, either completely or un-
less the right is properly reserved. The next part discusses two cases addressing 
the right to reimbursement of defense costs that apply Nevada law as well as 
the questions and possible solutions that these cases left unanswered. 
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF FORUM INSURANCE AND BLAZER: DO THESE CASES
CARRY THE DAY IN NEVADA, OR ARE THEY APPROPRIATE ONLY IN LIMITED 
CIRCUMSTANCES?  
The Nevada Supreme Court has been silent with regard to the right to re-
imbursement, either as a strategic choice or merely by chance. The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, applying Nevada law, and the Nevada District Court 
have each issued a single ruling on the issue of the right to reimbursement. This 
part analyzes whether the Ninth Circuit and Nevada District Courts’ limited 
rulings are appropriate outside the specific facts of those decisions. This part 
also considers and evaluates the questions these cases left in their wake. 
109  Morgan, supra note 1. 
110  See generally Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1997). 
111  Tex. Ass’n of Ctys. Cty. Gov’t Risk Mgmt. Pool v. Matagorda Cty., 52 S.W.3d 128, 
135–36 (Tex. 2000) (“Requiring the insurer, rather than the insured, to choose a course of 
action is appropriate because the insurer is in the business of analyzing and allocating risk 
and is in the best position to assess the viability of its coverage dispute. . . . On balance, in-
surers are better positioned to handle this risk, either by drafting policies to specifically pro-
vide for reimbursement or by accounting for the possibility that they may occasionally pay 
uncovered claims in their rate structure.”). 
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As the previous sections have illustrated, there is no majority position in 
United States’ courts concerning whether insurers may seek reimbursement for 
defense costs of non-covered claims. While some jurisdictions, such as those in 
California, Texas, Pennsylvania, and New York, have expressly ruled on this 
issue, the majority of jurisdictions, including Nevada, have yet to determine 
this matter. Moving forward, this will be a pressing issue for Nevada courts, 
both federal and state, as insurers and policyholders continue to be at odds over 
who should pay for defense costs when claims are later determined to be un-
covered by insurance policies.  
A. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is the First to Apply Nevada Law to the
Right to Reimbursement
Federal diversity courts must apply state law when construing insurance
policies.112 “Accordingly, [federal courts] must construe the policy as a Nevada 
state court would if presented with the same question.”113 Under Nevada law, 
the duty to defend is extended to all potentially covered claims, however there 
is “no duty to defend where there is no coverage.”114 
The first case applying Nevada law to the right to reimbursement, Forum 
Insurance Co. v. County of Nye, was decided in an unpublished opinion by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Forum, Nye County breached a hospital 
management agreement and was in violation of a reservation of rights letter 
sent by the insurer on January 28, 1988.115 Under the insurance policy, cover-
age did not extend to contractual obligations.116 However, Nye County argued 
that there were possible tort claims, and the insurer agreed to undertake the de-
fense but mailed a reservation of rights letter stating that it would seek recoup-
ment should it later be found that the duty to defend did not exist at the time the 
management agreement was breached.117 
Nye County never agreed to the terms contained in the reservation of rights 
letter and, in fact, objected to such terms.118 However, Nye County “continued 
to accept a defense valued at hundreds of thousands of dollars. The court or-
dered the County to reimburse [the insurer] for the costs of the defense that the 
County accepted after the January letter.”119 The court emphasized that the in-
112  Fortis Benefits Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 966 F. Supp. 987, 989 (D. Nev. 1997). 
113  Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Blazer, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1084 (D. Nev. 1999); see Fortis 
Benefits Ins. Co., 966 F. Supp. at 989–90. 
114  Bidart v. Am. Title Ins. Co., 734 P.2d 732, 734 (Nev. 1987) (citing Snow v. Pioneer Title 
Ins. Co., 444 P.2d 125, 128 (1968)); see also Forum Ins. Co. v. Cty. of Nye, No. 91-16724, 
1994 WL 241384, at *2 (9th Cir. June 3, 1994); Rockwood Ins. Co. v. Federated Capital 
Corp., 694 F. Supp. 772, 776 (D. Nev. 1988). 
115  Forum Ins. Co., 1994 WL 241384, at *1–2. 
116  Id. at *1. 
117  Id. at *2. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
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surer was put at a severe disadvantage in this case and was denied the ability to 
recoup substantial costs.120 In such a situation, the court feared that “[t]he in-
surer would be forced to withhold the defense in order to get the requisite 
agreement and reserve its right to seek a later adjudication. Such a result would 
benefit no one.”121 The court believed it to be a better solution all around to al-
low insurers to seek recoupment through a reservation of rights, so long as it is 
done in a “manner least damaging to both parties” and the policyholder “has 
unambiguous notice that it may later be held responsible for costs incurred.”122 
Further, the court, citing a California case, held that “ ‘[a]cceptance of 
monies constitutes an implied agreement to the reservation’ of the right to seek 
reimbursement.”123 The Ninth Circuit specifically relied on principles of equity 
and fairness, finding fault with the county for refusing to accept the new terms 
in the reservation of rights letter yet accepting the insured’s significant pay-
ments for the defense.124 Forum is a unique case due to its fact pattern. The 
county asserted that there were potential tort claims, but, in the end, there were 
no potentially covered claims under the policy.125 Thus, as a non-mixed action 
suit that was decided over a decade ago, it provides limited guidance for other 
Nevada courts in regard to mixed action suits. 
B. The Nevada District Court Weighs in on the Right to Reimbursement
Five years after the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Forum, a Nevada federal court
was again faced with the issue of insurers’ seeking the right to reimbursement. 
Capitol Indemnity Corporation v. Blazer involved three men, Peter Banach, 
Buddy Simpson, and David Lawrence Shaw.126 On January 23, 1997, the three 
men were customers at a local tavern called Bird Off Paradise Lounge.127 Rob-
ert Blazer, Jr. owned and operated the tavern.128 While at the tavern, Banach 
and Simpson assaulted and battered Shaw, from which Shaw suffered bodily 
harm, including a complete loss of vision in his left eye.129 
While Banach and Simpson were found guilty on criminal charges, Shaw 
later filed a civil suit as well, naming Blazer, his tavern, and the bartender on 
duty the night of January 23, 1997, as defendants.130 At the time of the assault, 
Blazer had a CGL insurance policy with Capitol Indemnity Corporation (“Capi-
120  Id. at *3. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. (quoting Walbrook Ins. Co. v. Goshgarian, 726 F. Supp. 777, 784 (C.D. Cal. 1989)). 
124  Id. 
125  Id. at *2. 
126  Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Blazer, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1082 (D. Nev. 1999). 
127  Id. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. 
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tol Indemnity”).131 “The policy provides coverage for bodily injury only if it is 
caused by an ‘occurrence.’ ”132 Additionally, the CGL policy encompassed mul-
tiple exclusionary provisions that barred coverage even for qualifying “occur-
rence[s].”133 One of the exceptions contained in the CGL policy was for assault 
and battery.134 Accordingly, on July 13, 1998, Capitol Indemnity filed a claim 
for declaratory relief, alleging it had no duty to defend and seeking compensa-
tion for all expenditures sustained in the defense of Shaw’s claims.135 
 The Blazer court analyzed this matter and reached specific findings and 
conclusions. First, the court determined that the assault and battery claims were 
barred from coverage under the exclusionary provisions of the CGL policy.136 
Second, the court addressed Capitol Indemnity’s reimbursement claim. The ul-
timate issue in this case was whether the insurer was “required to reserve its 
rights before it [could] pursue reimbursement.”137 The court held that Capitol 
Indemnity could not seek reimbursement for defense costs.138 However, the 
court did not ban insurers outright from seeking recoupment. Instead, the court 
maintained: “The right to reimbursement does not arise unless there is an un-
derstanding between the parties that the insured would be required to reimburse 
the insurer for monies expended in providing a defense. . . . The insured must 
have ‘unambiguous notice that it may later be held responsible for costs in-
curred.’ ”139 
 In order to seek recoupment, the court required “a clear understanding be-
tween the parties that [the insurer] reserved the right to reimbursement.”140 
Here, no evidence was presented that Capitol Indemnity had an understanding 
with Blazer, and thus, reimbursement was denied.141 In its opinion, the court 
called on additional Nevada case law and further elaborated that efforts to limit 
insurance policies must be clear and explicit and that any insurer seeking to 
limit coverage should utilize language that clearly and expressly communicates 
such limitations to the policyholder.142 
 The Blazer opinion represents only a narrow portion of the right to reim-
bursement. The Blazer court chose not to elaborate further on the issues of re-
imbursement outside of the facts of this case. The Blazer opinion may show 
that in order to seek recoupment of defense costs, the policyholder must essen-
131  Id. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. 
135  Id. at 1083. 
136  Id. at 1091. 
137  Id. at 1090. 
138  Id. at 1091. 
139  Id. at 1090 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 1090–91. 
142  Id. at 1084 (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. v. Reno’s Exec. Air Inc., 682 P.2d 1380, 1382 
(Nev. 1984); Sullivan v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 649 P.2d 1357, 1358 (Nev. 1982)). 
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tially agree to the insurer’s seeking reimbursement, however whether this is ac-
tually what the court desired is not clear.143 To others, most likely insurers in 
Nevada, the Blazer opinion stands for the proposition that insurers may seek 
reimbursement so long as the reservation of the right is clearly communicated. 
No Nevada court, neither federal or state, has specifically addressed the right to 
reimbursement since Blazer. Therefore, many questions remain unanswered. 
C. Questions Left Unanswered in Nevada: Will Future Decisions Follow
Precedent, or Will the Courts Deviate?
 While the Nevada District Court made a limited ruling on the right to re-
imbursement, many issues remain unaddressed in Nevada. Did the decision in 
Blazer prohibit insurers from seeking the right to reimbursement? Does Blazer 
allow for reimbursement so long as “unambiguous notice” of the possibility of 
recoupment is given to the policyholder?144 Or instead, does Blazer require the 
insurer to receive unequivocal agreement from the policyholder in order seek 
recoupment? These are just a few of the many questions the Blazer decision left 
unanswered. 
The analysis is further complicated by the Forum decision, which was de-
cided five years prior to Blazer and expressly addressed reservation of rights 
letters.145 Does continued acceptance of defense equate to acceptance of new 
contract terms? Does the express refusal to accept the terms contained in a res-
ervation of rights letter count for nothing? Does Forum apply in mixed action 
cases, or is its ruling applicable only when it is later determined that there are 
no causes of action covered by the CGL insurance policy? And most important-
ly, moving forward, will Nevada Courts look to these two decisions at all, or 
will they instead look to other states, such as California, Texas, Pennsylvania, 
and New York, which have defined decisions concerning the right to reim-
bursement more clearly? All these questions, and more, remain undecided and 
are likely to be issues before both the Nevada Supreme Court and the Nevada 
District Court in the near future. 
Taking these questions in turn, Nevada courts will need to look to the two 
limited decisions applying Nevada law, as well as the case law of other juris-
dictions that have ruled on recoupment of defense costs.146 While the Blazer 
143  See Capitol Indem. Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1090; Allen et al., supra note 21, at 14 
(“[A]n insurer may be reimbursed for costs incurred in defending against ‘claims not poten-
tially covered under the insurance policy only if there was a clear understanding between the 
parties that [the insurer] reserved the right to reimbursement for the costs of the investigation 
and/or defense’[]. The apparent requirement of agreement by the policyholder effectively 
disallows reimbursement.”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Capitol Indem. Corp., 51 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1090). 
144  Capitol Indem. Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d at 1090. 
145  See Forum Ins. Co. v. Cty. of Nye, No. 91-16724, 1994 WL 241384, at *2 (9th Cir. June 
3, 1994). 
146  See Capitol Indem. Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d. at 1082; Forum Ins. Co., 1994 WL 241384, at 
*3.
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court held that the insurer, Capitol Indemnity, could not seek reimbursement, it 
did not ban insurers outright from seeking recoupment.147 Instead, the court fo-
cused on the “clear understanding” between the insurer and the policyholder 
that the insurer may seek reimbursement of defense costs.148 Additionally, from 
Forum, it is unclear whether the court’s holding that reservation of rights letters 
or new contract terms are recognized upon the acceptance of defense costs in 
mixed action claims or only when a case involves non-covered claims. 
Therefore, the next scenario examines these hypothetical questions and 
lays out a possible “best-case” situation for Nevada. These questions are as-
sessed in a way that demonstrates which position favors insurers and the ability 
to freely seek the right to reimbursement while also clearly identifying when 
the policyholder is better served such that the right to reimbursement should be 
outright denied or, alternatively, heavily restricted. These possible answers will 
be scrutinized based on case law from both Nevada and the other jurisdictions 
previously discussed.149 
V. A “WHAT IF” SITUATION AS APPLIED TO NEVADA: WHAT IS THE BEST
OPTION? 
When analyzing situations that present the possibility of the right to reim-
bursement, the vast majority of states have been indecisive in determining how 
best to rule. Given the same set of facts, one court may rule one way while an-
other rules the exact opposite. Or, in some cases, a court may simply refuse to 
address the right to reimbursement at all. However, with the right to reim-
bursement being pushed into the court system by insurance companies, this is 
an issue that ultimately cannot be avoided. In Nevada, a clear, sustainable anal-
ysis has to be developed to avoid unnecessary confusion by insurers and poli-
cyholders alike. 
A. The “Best Case” Situation for Nevada: Allow Insurers to Seek Limited
Rights to Reimbursement
Moving forward, it is proposed that the best plan for Nevada would be to
implement a mix of the California and Texas approaches: respectively, free 
allowance of and adamant refusal of the right to reimbursement. On one hand, 
if Nevada forbids insurers from seeking the right to reimbursement in all situa-
tions, insurers may get saddled with exorbitant defense costs for claims that are 
not and were never covered by the insurance policies; such was the situation in 
Buss v. Superior Court. Alternatively, adopting a plan that allows insurers to 
seek the right to reimbursement without express restrictions can and easily will 
lead to situations in which policyholders are stuck with a bill for defense costs 
147  Capitol Indem. Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d. at 1090–91. 
148  Id. at 1090. 
149  California, Texas, Pennsylvania, and New York are the previously mentioned jurisdic-
tions. 
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they never bargained for and frankly never imagined would be theirs to bear. 
Therefore, the argument can be made that the “best-case” situation would be 
for Nevada to adopt a plan that favors neither insurers nor policyholders too 
heavily but instead creates a workable middle-ground policy under which all 
future CGL right to reimbursement issues can be adjudicated. 
First and foremost, insurers in Nevada should not be permitted to recover 
defense costs paid to settle non-covered claims unless the insurer timely re-
serves the right to reimbursement. One can imagine a situation in which, on the 
eve of trial or settlement, an insurer attempts to execute a reservation of rights 
against a policyholder. In such a situation, the policyholder may very well ac-
cept the insurer’s terms as a way to end what is likely to be a tedious, prohibi-
tively expensive lawsuit. Thus, Nevada must adopt a policy that seeks to avoid 
such a situation. 
To resolve the issue of timeliness, Nevada should look to adopt one of two 
rules. Under the first, which is likely to be favored by policyholders, Nevada 
could require insurers to add express language to all CGL insurance policies 
notifying the policyholder, before they ever sign an insurance agreement, that 
the insurer maintains the right to seek reimbursement of uncovered defense 
costs. While this seems like an easy solution to many of the problems discussed 
herein, insurers are incredibly hesitant to adopt such language. Part of this fear 
may stem from stiff competition in the insurance market. Alternatively, this re-
sistance may arise from the general refusal by the insurance industry to adopt 
such new and restrictive express language. Whatever the reasoning, this option 
is likely to be highly disfavored by insurers but would resolve issues involving 
equity and fairness. 
A second option with regard to timeliness would be to allow insurers to 
seek a reservation of rights, most likely through express reservation of rights 
letters, but to put strict time constraints on such letters. Under such a policy, 
insurers would be prohibited from reserving reimbursement rights close to trials 
and settlements. In fact, a more equitable solution would be to require insurers 
to reserve the right to reimbursement from the moment they agree to defend a 
claim that may potentially be uncovered by the policy. With the adoption of 
such a policy, both insurers and policyholders would have knowledge of clear 
guidelines, and neither party would be too heavily favored. Whether this option 
is viable in practice is yet to be determined. 
Next, even a timely reservation of rights should be deemed invalid within 
Nevada should there not be an express agreement between the insurer and the 
policyholder concerning the reservation of rights. Under this rule, if a policy-
holder does not have clear knowledge that the insurer may seek reimbursement 
of defense costs in the future and the claims are found to be uncovered, then the 
timely reservation of rights is void. This position likely favors the policyholder; 
however, there is incredibly high probative value for such favoritism. The in-
surer inherently possesses more power in an insurer-policyholder relationship. 
Because of this power inequity, the policyholder has a high probability of never 
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knowing or understanding that the insurer may seek reimbursement of defense 
costs absent express acknowledgment by the policyholder. Thus, requiring ex-
press policy terms, as well as a clear acknowledgement of the right to reim-
bursement by the policyholder, is an equitable and just solution. 
An additional option would be merely to require insurers to allow reserva-
tion of rights via properly executed reservation of rights letters, even without 
agreement on the part of the policyholder. This plan heavily favors the insurer 
and is highly inequitable in regard to power balancing. It is nearly indisputable 
that during the early stage of litigation, insurers have the lion’s share of bar-
gaining power in the insurer/policyholder relationship. As such, allowing an 
insurer to unilaterally amend insurance policies by adding new terms where 
there has never been precedent to do so would lead to issues of fairness and 
would result in significant litigation. Conversely, from the insurer’s perspec-
tive, it is arguable that the insurer is taking a huge risk by undertaking the de-
fense of potentially uncovered claims. Thus, equity heavily favors the oppor-
tunity of the insurer to seek recoupment once a reservation of rights letter has 
been issued. Accordingly, although this option also has the potential to be 
adopted by the Nevada court system, unilateral amendment of contract terms is 
generally disfavored. 
 Third, Nevada courts must make a clear rule regarding the acceptance of 
defense costs. Merely because a policyholder accepts payment of defense costs 
from the insurer does not mean that new contract terms reserving the right to 
reimbursement have been established. Unlike some previously discussed juris-
dictions, it is inequitable to allow insurers to state that an implied reservation of 
rights was created due to the power imbalance discussed herein. Conversely, 
should a timely and express understanding between parties already be estab-
lished, a policyholder should be forbidden from accepting defense costs and 
then later attempting to argue that reimbursement rights were not formed. Such 
was the case in Forum. 
Finally, Nevada should impose strong regulation concerning reservation of 
rights letters. However, the rule established by Nevada must not be so strict as 
to deny that rights were reserved solely because a policyholder objects to the 
reservation. If such a rule were adopted, policyholders (or more likely attorneys 
on their behalf) would merely reply with a rejection letter in response to all in-
surers’ reservation of rights letters and arguably leave insurers in situations 
such as that of Buss. Alternatively, the validity and extent of reservation of 
rights letters will require a factual determination by the court. The timing, lan-
guage, and understanding of each letter will likely determine its validity. Ac-
cordingly, the preferred adaptation for Nevada would be to implement a policy 
that requires policyholders to have clear and express knowledge that the insurer 
is reserving the right to seek reimbursement of non-covered claims in the fu-
ture. Thus, to avoid issues with implied contract terms and to resolve several of 
the issues surrounding reservation of rights letters, insurers and policyholders 
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must have clear understanding before a reservation of rights letter is deemed 
valid. 
In summary, Nevada should look to adopt a policy that balances the desire 
to protect both insurers and policyholders. Insurers need protection from astro-
nomically high and unjust defense costs while policyholders require shielding 
from insurers who maintain the vast majority of the bargaining power and are 
seeking to unilaterally and inequitably amend policy terms for their own bene-
fit. Thus, Nevada should attempt to implement a plan that requires at least these 
three requirements: (1) timely reservation of rights; (2) express reservation of 
rights that results in a clear understanding between the insurer and the policy-
holder; and (3) clear guidelines concerning acceptance of defense costs and 
reservation of rights letters. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts faced with deciding between allowing or denying insurers the right 
to recoup defense costs must always consider the express language of the un-
derlying insurance policy itself as well as general legal principles. It is equita-
ble to require that an insurer stay true to the language of the policy that it draft-
ed or to require that insurers include express language within the CGL policy 
itself reserving the right to seek reimbursement. Additionally, courts must con-
tinue to look to concepts including unjust enrichment, the duty to defend, other 
contract principles, and public policy concerns in making decisions concerning 
the right to reimbursement. Policyholders, while not completely helpless, are at 
a severe disadvantage in regard to bargaining with their insurers. It will be in-
teresting to see which position the many jurisdictions that have yet to decide 
the issue will favor. Yet even more interesting will be the decision reached by 
the Nevada courts and their rationale for such a decision. 
